Nigel Biggar: In Defence of War
Chapter three is entitled “The principal of double effect.” In it the author argues (here in contradiction to St. Augustine) that it is possible for the just war soldier not to primarily desire the death and destruction of his enemies, although that is often necessary. That is, the taking of prisoners and disarming of the aggressive nation can be a primary goal. We can think of WWII, when indeed many German soldiers were killed. However, especially in the last weeks of the war, it became a case of mostly rounding up and disarming prisoners – who gladly surrendered to American forces rather than be taken by the Soviet Army.
Chapter 4 is entitled “Proportionality,” and is subtitled “Lessons from the Somme and the First World War.” Biggar goes against the consensus view that World War I was a useless war, stumbled into by incompetent diplomacy and economic rivalry. Using the latest and voluminous research available, Biggar shows that indeed Germany was the prime culprit in initiating the war. For the German High Command, beginning a war soon was a priority, as Imperial Russia was rapidly industrializing. Allowing Russia to form an alliance with France would have been a serious threat to Germany’s plans for the domination of Europe. Further, German nationalism, the cult of Bismarck, and racial contempt for the Slavic peoples of the East was already a major factor in German thinking.
The most surprising element of Biggar’s analysis is his judgement about the 1916 Battle of the Somme. The battle was enormously costly to the British and also costly to the Germans, but it saved the French Army from collapse during their Battle of Verdun. Thus, the Battle of the Somme ultimately blocked the domination of Europe by a proto-Nazi Germany. I found this chapter the most fascinating of the book, and Biggar’s mastery of the materials pertaining to the War particularly impressive.
Biggar’s next chapter, “Against legal positivism and liberal individualism” is important but far less engrossing. Biggar makes the technical point that just war status should not be granted automatically to a nation defending its borders, as certain nation states can be horrendously tyrannical and indeed are worthy to be invaded. An example of this was the Pol Pot regime of Cambodia which was mercifully put to an end by the invading Vietnamese Army.
The next chapter is “On not always giving the devil benefit of law: legality, morality and Kosovo.” Biggar concludes that the NATO armed intervention to save the Muslims from genocide in Kosovo was a form of just war. However, according to current international law, it was an illegal intrusion into a nation’s internal affairs. For Biggar, “natural law” (a concept still active among Roman Catholic theologians) trumps current international law, and morality trumps legality.
Category: Fall 2015, Living the Faith